which opened new possibilities for industrialization of agriculture. Nils RollHansen provides a nice example of the complexities of history: Wilhelm Johannsen, who introduced the term gene (in 1909) and the distinction between genotype and phenotype (in 1906) , was reluctant to admit the localization of genes on the chromosomes. For him, genotype was a holistic notion that could be identified with the organism as a whole. This strange (for us) attitude was motivated by his desire to exclude any form of morphological preformism from the notions of gene and genotype.
In the early decades of research, genes were considered insufficient by many for explaining complex biological phenomena, and they were rejected for philosophical reasons, such as a predilection for holistic explanations and Lamarckian inheritance. By providing a broad overview of the various oppositions to the causal role of genes, Ute Deichmann demonstrates, a contrario, how research programs based on genes have indeed been productive until the present time. The lesson is that historians must avoid regarding past opposition to genes and their causal role as anticipations of the recent questioning of the received view of the structure and functions of genes. This has emerged entirely from results obtained during recent decades.
Eric Davidson, together with Isabelle Peter and Emmanuel Faure, synthesized the computation automaton for development on the basis of the most comprehensive gene regulatory network model. In a reflection on the meaning of this work, Davidson shows that the development of a complex eukaryotic organism-the sea urchin-is fully driven by its genes acting within a hierarchical gene regulatory network.
Genes are also highly visible in current technical and scientific discussions-even corporations now have their own genes and DNA. However, genes are often simply used as biomarkers, and their causal role is left aside. This is the case when, for example, forensic scientists working with the police use DNA to identify potential criminals. It is also the case when genes are recruited to tell us something about the existence of races, or the origins of peoples. Myles Jackson shows how biological criteria were used to hierarchize, and discriminate, human populations from the end of the 18th century. Justification of slavery in the 19th century, based on the purported existence of biological differences between Caucasians and Africans is a striking example. Later, genetic markers were also used; it has been shown that eugenic policies in the United States were targeted mainly against people of color. The idea that human races could be distinguished by the possession of specific genetic markers has been discredited, but Jackson shows how the question of the distinction between human races has recently reemerged in medicine, notably for studies on diseases that are more prevalent in some populations than in others. Looking at the U.S. population as a whole would prevent efficient detection of these rare diseases and the development of therapies specifically targeted against them. Between present-day medicine and a future, fully personalized one, is there at least a transient place for a "racial medicine"? The risk, obviously, is a return of "genetic essentialism" to the world of thoughts.
Sophie Kohler argues that there is another, more mundane, risk of using genetic markers: not helping us answer the historical questions we ask. By examining two genetic studies on the origins of Ashkenazi Jews, she demonstrates that these studies have not afforded the simple answers that were anticipated. Her most important message is that the success of such studies obviously requires long, interdisciplinary efforts to formulate historical issues that can be efficiently addressed by genetic studies.
Two types of recent observations have been amply used as arguments against models giving genes a causal role in development: the difficulty of isolating genes involved in human diseases such as autism, and the numerous studies done on the epigenetic modifications of the genome. Bertrand Jordan demonstrates that the difficulty in discovering the genes involved in autism does not mean that this trait is not highly heritable-in other words, causally determined by the genes of the affected individuals. The problem is that autism is a complex, multiple syndrome, in which many genes (together with the environment) are involved during development of the disease. It appears likely that rare genetic variants are responsible for a large proportion of the cases.
Gary Felsenfeld argues that epigenetics is also not a great challenge to the causal role of genes. In a wonderfully clear contribution, contrasting with the ambiguities of a large part of the scientific literature on these issues, he underlines the confusion between the involvement of epigenetic marks in the control of gene expression, and the causal role of these marks. In most cases, the causal event is the binding of transcription factors, initiating different epigenetic modifications. A direct causal role of epigenetic marks, and their capacity to reproduce, remains to be demonstrated.
Not only have the gene and its causal role remained with us, but new genes can be born. Diethard Tautz convincingly argues for the existence of a de novo evolution, through the appearance of new proteins with no relationship to preexisting ones. More fascinating than the observation itself was the former lack of readiness of geneticists to accept indicators for the existence of such a phenomenon. Obviously, the data were rare, but more important was the existence of dominant models that left no place for this de novo evolution. Tautz's contribution should be on the toread list of all students of biology, to help them keep their minds open to the importance of new observations and hypotheses.
Tautz also reminds us that the genome is not a stable structure, but rather an evolving one, an issue taken up by Michel Morange, who argues that the diversity of structures and functions of genes results from a long evolutionary history. Taking this historical dimension into account can help prevent the emergence of acrimonious debates, such as the ones over "junk" DNA that followed the release of the results of the ENCODE program. It would also help answer the criticisms recently raised about the gene and its causal role.
Genes have never been conceived of in just one way. While the majority of practitioners have continued to deal with genes as carriers of information for the biosynthesis of proteins, our understanding of the precise structure of genes, as well as their causal roles, has evolved dramatically in the past decades. The existence of a diversity of gene concepts is the natural consequence of the fact that genomes are the result of evolution. This fact has begun to be understood and translated into genetic research only recently. The existence of this diversity of gene concepts is not a true challenge to the power of genes.
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